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Mulry: Sexual Harassment

SEXUAL HARASSMENT:WHO WILL PAY
THE PRICE OF SCANDAL?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sexual harassment seems to be the buzzword of the moment,
invading the everyday milieu of the workplace, classroom and
nightly news commentary.! Despite our collective rage, it occurs
with such frequency that it is almost commonplace and commonly
accepted.2 The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s provided the
impetus to correct the disparate treatment endured by certain
classes of people.3 "While it began as a backlash against racial
hatred and discrimination, the movement expanded to include
discrimination on the basis of religion, national origin and sex.""
Obviously, much has yet to be learned in dealing with insidious
discrimination, including that based on sex. In our country's
attempts at righting these civil wrongs, the law has created certain
duties for employers and federally funded schools, imposing upon
them the dual task of watchdog and enforcer. 5 The United States
See generally Susan Estrich, Sex At Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813 (1991).
"'Sexual harassment' [is] a term which was not even coined until the 1970s was not recognized in trial courts until the late 1970s, and was only affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court in the 1980s." Id. at 816.
2 See James T. Madore, When Work Turns Ugly, NEWSDAY,
April 5, 1998, at
4. In response to a poll, some twenty-five percent of women indicated that they
were the victims of harassment in the workplace, with half that number
reporting emotional harassment or inappropriate touching. Id. Indeed, males
comprised eleven percent of the cases reported to the U. S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id.
3 Michael P. Meliti, Civil Rights - Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 - Implied PrivateRight of Action Under Title IX Will Not Lie by Reason of
Teacher's Sexual Harassmentof Student When District Official With Authority
Did Not Have Actual Notice and Was Not Deliberately Indifferent to Such
Conduct - Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 118 S. Ct. 1989
(1998),
9 SETONHALLCONST. L. J. 213, (1998).
4
Id.
5 See generally Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The
Employers' Paradoxin Responding to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
-- A Proposed Way Out, 67 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1517 (1999). "(An] employer's
duty to correct a hostile environment arises when it knows of the existence of
that environment .... " Id at 1552. See also Philip T.K. Daniel, Violence and
the Public Schools: Student Rights Have Been Weighed in the Balance and
Found Wanting, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 573 (1998). "[S]chool officials face liability
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Congress has sought to ensure equal opportunity via such
legislation as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter
"Title VII"],6 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
[hereinafter 'Title IX"], 7 empowering courts with the necessary
legal predicates to .eradicate.pernicious harassment motivated by
animus and to put an end to the resultant biased victimization.8
Indeed, 1998 was the year of sexual harassment as evident in the
country's highest court and in the court of public opinion." While
the United States Supreme Court made great strides in the area of
sexual harassment, deciding a quartet of cases involving employer
and public school liability,'0 the country's Executive-in-Chief
fought his own legal battles involving allegations of sexual
misconduct. Thus, even the actions of a sitting President taken
when they know of sexual harassment against students by employees and take
no immediate action to address the deleterious conduct." Id. at 605.
6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701, 703 (a)(1), as amended,
42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1998).
7 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, §§ 901-909, as amended, 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1990).
8 See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
"The language of Title VII makes clear the purpose of Congress to assure
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to
the disadvantage of minority citizens." Id. at 800. See also Glenn M. Wong &
Carol Barr, Title IX Wields a Mightier Sword, ATHLETIC BUSINESS, May 1992,
at 16-17 (noting that after a recent United States Supreme Court decision
allowing compensatory damages, Title IX has evolved "from a purely protective
statute into an offensive weapon").
9 See generally Marley S. Weiss, The Supreme Court 1997-1998 Labor and
Employment Law Term (Part ): The Sexual Harassment Decisions, 14 LAB.
LAW 261 (1998), This article notes that:
Specialists in the field of labor and employment law will remember this
Supreme Court term as the year of the sexual harassment trilogy, or
perhaps, counting the Title IX case decided this year, quartet. The Paula
Jones litigation has further contributed to the public impression that this
has been the year of sexual harassment litigation.
Id.
10 See 129 WEST'S EDUC. LAW REP. 887 (1998). "The Supreme Court decided
four sexual harassment cases in the 1997-98 Term, returning to this
controversial area for the first time since 1992." Id. at 892. See also Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998 (1998); Gebser v. Lago Vista
Indep. School Dist., 118 S.Ct. 1989 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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prior to and outside the scope of the office could not escape Title
VII scrutiny.1" This Comment will survey the evolution of the law
of sexual harassment, including the recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, which have further defined the contours of
liability for employers and schools that receive federal funds. Part
I sets forth the definition of sexual harassment, both in the
workplace and educational contexts.' 2 Part II discusses Title VII
and the concomitant case law that have set forth the standards upon
which an employer may be held liable for the sexually harassing
conduct of a supervisor, co-worker, or third party.' 3 Part III
similarly describes the statutory background of Title IX and its
varying judicial interpretations in the area of teacher-student sexual
harassment. 14 This section deals extensively with the judicially
implied right of action for student victims,'6 the decision that
allowed money damages for student victims, t6 and the Supreme
Court's imposition of a heightened standard in situations of
teacher-student harassment.1 7 Finally, Part IV will review the
Supreme Court's recent decision in another landmark case,' which
makes federally funded schools accountable for peer (or studentto-student) sexual harassment.' 9
II.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT DEFINED

What type of conduct constitutes sexual harassment? Courts
have grappled with this question in trying to delineate between
behavior that is questionable and that which is actionable.20 The
term 'Sexual harassment' has been defined generally as the
" See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (granting President
Clinton's motion for summary judgment after finding that Paula Jones failed to
establish a basis for a claim of either quid pro quo sexual harassment or hostile
environment
sexual harassment).
1
2 See infra notes 20-41 and accompanying text.
'3See infra notes 42-104 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 105-223 and accompanying text.
15
See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
16 See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60 (1992).
17 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524
U.S.274 (1998).
"'See infra notes 224-280 and accompanying text.
'9See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
20 Monica E. McFadden, But Is It Harassment?,34 TRIAL 48 (Dec. 1998).
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unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power. 2' The concept that a worker may be
subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct because of a supervisor's
ability to exact far-reaching career consequences, or that a teacher
may impose his/her sexual will on a vulnerable student with that
student's grade hanging in the balance, forms the very basis for
liability of those in a better position to halt such behavior - i.e.,
employers and school districts.
The United States Supreme Court has adopted the definition of
sexual harassment posited by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission [hereinafter "EEOC"] in its Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex.2 The EEOC Guidelines set forth
the following:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec.
703 of Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive
23
working environment.
21

Katherine S. Anderson, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual

Harassmentafter Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1258,
1258 n.1 (1987) (citing C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 1 (1979)).
22Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). The Court

stated that "[i]n 1980 the EEOC issued Guidelines specifying that 'sexual
harassment,' as there defined, is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title
VII .... In defining 'sexual harassment,' the Guidelines first describe the kinds
of workplace conduct that may be actionable under Title VII ....

Relevant to

the charges at issue in this case, the Guidelines provide that such sexual
misconduct constitutes prohibited 'sexual harassment' ....
2329

C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
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In the educational context, sexual harassment has been defined
by the National Advisory Council on Women's Educational
Programs to mean "the use of authority to emphasize the sexuality
or sexual identity of the student in a manner which prevents or
impairs the student's full enjoyment of education[al] benefits,
climate, or opportunities."'
Sexual harassment has been generally grouped into two
categories: "quid pro quo harassment" and "hostile environment
harassment." 2 Quid pro quo harassment in the workplace occurs
when the receipt of tangible job benefits is conditioned upon
submission to unwelcome sexual conduct, or when rejection of
such conduct results in negative employment consequences. 26 The
classic case of quid pro quo is when a superior threatens dismissal
of an employee for not engaging in certain sexual acts, or when a
job benefit is conferred in exchange for sexual favors. The
hallmark of a quid pro quo case2 7is an exchange premised on
disproportionate status or authority.
The more difficult type of sexual harassment claim to bring is
that based on the active creation of a hostile work environment.2
This type of harassment occurs when unwelcome sexual conduct
unreasonably interferes with the performance of one's job or
creates an intimidating and offensive work atmosphere.2 Such
claims are more common and usually involve conduct or
comments which are offensive, or involve sexual innuendo that
creates an intolerable work environment.30 One might think that
Jill Suzanne Miller, Title VI and Title VII: Happy Together as a Resolution
to Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995 U. ILL L. REV. 699, 707
24

(1995) (quoting the Advisory Council on Women's Educational Program's
definition of sexual harassment in education) (further citations omitted).

2 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62. "[A] violation of Title VII may be predicated
on either of two types of sexual harassment: harassment that involves the
conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, and harassment
that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile or offensive
working environment." Id.
2

See id.

27See i&
29

'3

McFadden, supra note 20, at 48.
McFadden, supra note 20, at 48.
SusAN L. SEGAL, WOMEN'S LEGAL GUiDE 226 (Barbara R. Hauser, ed.,

Fulcrum Publishing 1996). "A hostile work environment exists when: (1) The
employee is subjected to unwelcome harassment by a fellow employee or
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conduct that includes sex-specific and derogatory language,
suggestions of sexual acts, and unwanted sexual advances or
touching would certainly constitute actionable sexual harassment.
However, "not all boorish and scandalous behavior is legally
considered to be sexual harassment. ' 3'
Indeed, courts and
commentators have opined that "merely offensive" conduct should
32
be prevented from being actionable as sexual harassment.
Furthermore, the conduct does not have to be purely sexual in
nature so long as it is directed at a person based on that person's
gender.
Both types of harassment claims may be brought in the
educational arena as well. In 1977, a federal district court in
Connecticut was the first to recognize a claim of quid pro quo
sexual harassment in the case of Alexander v. Yale University.33 In
that case, former students claimed that they were denied
educational benefits by the university's lack of a grievance policy
designed to deal with incidents of sexual harassment.3
One
female student claimed that she was offered a high grade by a
professor in exchange for sexual favors, and upon her refusal to
submit to his sexual advances, she received a low grade. 35 The
court found that academic achievement conditioned on sexual
favors did indeed amount to sex discrimination in education. 36
supervisor; (2) the harassment interfered with her employment by creating an
offensive work environment; (3) if the harassment is by a fellow employee, the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment." Id.
31 Id. "Much unpleasant behavior is not legally sexual harassment. Under the
'at will' doctrine, employers have no legal obligation to create fair and pleasant
workplaces. The theory is the worker who doesn't like the work environment or
the attitude and behavior of his or her supervisors can leave." Id. See also
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). Justice
Scalia cautioned against "courts and juries... mistak[ing] ordinary socializing
in the workplace -- such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation -for discriminatory conditions of employment." Id. at 1003.
32 See Cecilee Price-Huish, "Because the Constitution Requires
It and Because
Justice Demands It": Specific Speech Injunctive Relief for Title VII Hostile
Work Environment Claims, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193,203 (1998).
3 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), affd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
IId. at 2.
35 Id. at 3-4.
36 Id. at 4. Even though the court recognized a claim based on quid pro quo
sexual harassment in education, the action was dismissed for failure on the part
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Nonetheless, it was not until 1985 that a federal court first
allowed a claim of hostile environment in an educational setting.
In Moire v. Temple University School of Medicine,37 a medical
student brought a claim of hostile environment harassment on the
basis of conduct by her supervisor that subjected her to an
environment of sexual harassment and discrimination.3s She
essentially claimed that as a result of this hostile treatment, she
failed her third year of medical school.3 9 The Moire court
recognized a hostile environment claim brought against a teacher
by a student, and looked to the Title VII hostile work environment
cases for guidance. 40 While the district court recognized this right
of action and the Third Circuit affirmed that such a right existed,
the plaintiff failed to establish that the4 alleged conduct of her
supervisor created a hostile environment. '
III.

TITLE VII AND THE STANDARD OF LIABILITY
FOR EMPLOYERS

Title VII provides in pertinent part that "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.'42 But when is an employer held liable for sexual
harassment?
of the plaintiff to prove her harassment claim. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed
the decision, also recognizing the right of a student to claim quid pro quo sexual
harassment in the educational setting. Alexander, 631 F.2d at 185.
3 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), af'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
3s Id at 1365-66.
39 Id

40 Id at 1366-70.
41 Id.
4

2Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701,703 (a)(1), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (a)(1) (1998). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). The Court in Griggs made clear the purpose of Title VII by stating that:
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job
to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does
not command that any person be hired simply because he is a
member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any
group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress
has proscribed. What Congress requires is the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
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The United States Supreme Court first permitted sexual
harassment as a cause of action under Title VII in the landmark
case of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.43 The Meritor Court
"recognized the illegality of hostile environment sexual
harassment." 44 However, the Court specifically refrained from
creating a definitive standard for employer liability, opting instead
to provide the lower courts with the suggestion that they use
common law agency principles. The Court further reiterated
Congress' intent that employers should be held liable under Title
VII for certain acts of their employees, not automatically liable nor
insulated for mere lack of notice. 5 This instruction yielded many
varying decisions in the lower courts based on scope of
employment analyses.
In Meritor, the plaintiff Mechelle Vinson alleged that during the
course of her four years of employment at defendant bank, she had
"constantly been subjected to sexual harassment" by her boss,
Sidney Taylor, a vice president and manager at the bank and
Vinson's immediate supervisor.4 r Among other acts of sexual
degradation in the office place, Vinson testified that Taylor
repeatedly demanded sex with her and that she eventually agreed
because she was afraid of losing her job.
Taylor denied the
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification.
Id. at 430-31.
43 477 U.S. 57 (1986). "[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title
VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
environment." Id. at 66. Indeed the Court looked to the words of the Eleventh
Circuit in Henson v. Dundee, justifying an action for sexual harassment by
pointing to precedent in racial harassment cases, as follows:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return
for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as
demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
Id. (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)).
44 See Franklin, supra note 5, at 1526.
45 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. The Court "agree[d] with the EEOC that Congress
wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area." Id.
46 Id.at 60.
47

Id.
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allegations and claimed that Vinson was motivated to fabricate the
story of sexual misconduct because of a business-related dispute.4s
Meritor clarified the level of evidence necessary to show a
hostile environment violation. First, the Court made clear that
such a claim is not limited to economic or tangible
discrimination. 49 The Court stated that the harassing conduct
"must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive working environment. ' 0
Second, the Court corrected the lower court's ruling that there was
no sexual harassment if the sexual relationship was voluntary. s '
The Court reasoned that "the gravamen of any sexual harassment
''
claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.' 2
Thus, the question in a sexual harassment case is not whether a
plaintiff voluntarily participated in sexual intercourse; rather, it is
whether the plaintiff indicated by conduct that the sexual advances
were not, in fact, welcomed.3 The Court noted that in determining
whether the victim "by her conduct indicated" unwelcomeness,
factors such as the victim's "sexually provocative speech or dress"
may be taken into consideration.54
In Henson v. City of Dundee5s the Eleventh Circuit listed the
necessary elements of a hostile environment claim as follows:
(1) the employee belongs to a protected class; (2)
the employee was subject to harassment, that is,
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature; (3) the harassment was based on sex;
4"Id
at61.
49
Id. at 64.
so Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,904 (1 th Cir. 1982)).
5' Id. at 68 (stating that "the fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in
the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is

not
52 a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII").
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
53 Id. (stating that "[t]he correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her
actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary").
Id. at 69. Justice Rehnquist noted that "such evidence is obviously
relevant." Id.
'5 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
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(4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or
privilege of employment, that is, the conduct was
sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive
working 56environment; and (5) a basis for employer
liability.
The most difficult element to establish in this list is perhaps the
requirement that the harassment be sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment. Seven years after the Court's decision in
Meritor,the Court in Harrisv. ForkliftSystems, Inc.,57 gave further
substance to this element by setting forth that the spectrum of
disparate treatment included "intimidation, ridicule and insult."5 8
As such, when that conduct is imposed on an employee causing an
"abusive working environment," Title VII is violated.5 9 The Court
in Harris required a "middle path" standard, making actionable
conduct that is more than "merely offensive," but less than
"concrete psychological harm., 60 Thus, only conduct that is severe
enough to create an objectively hostile environment is within Title
Vil's purview. 6' Additionally, the Court found that for conduct to
5"Franklin, supra note 5, at 1527 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(1lth Cir. 1982)).
57 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
5'Id. at 21 (citing Meritor,477 U.S. at 65).
59 Id. (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67, in which the Supreme Court stated
that when the workplace is permeated with "discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult," that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive work
environment," Title VII is violated).
ro Id. at 21-22. "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads
to a nervous breakdown." Id. at 22.
6' Id. at 21. That is, "an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive." Id. But see Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419
(E.D. Mich. 1984). The court commented:
[I]t cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments,
humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes,
sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII
was not meant to -- or can-- change this ....Title VII is the
federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal employment
opportunity for the female workers of America. But it is quite
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have altered the terms and conditions of one's employment, the
victim must have subjectively perceived an abusive environment.6
Therefore, the need to demonstrate psychological harm is obviated
if an objective person would view the conduct as creating a hostile
environment and the person that is the subject of the conduct
perceives the hostile environment.6 Finally, determining whether
a work environment is sufficiently hostile to be actionable requires
consideration of all the circumstances, including "the frequency of
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance. ' ' 4
Post-Meritor, the lower courts utilized the Restatement (Second)
of Agency, and specifically section 219, to decide the scope of an
employer's liability in sexual harassment cases.6 Applying these
principles, courts established employer liability for quid pro quo
sexual harassment by a supervisor, despite the employer's lack of
knowledge of the harassing conduct.6 As such, an employer was
usually held vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment where
different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a

magical transformation in the social mores of American workers.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 21-22.
6 Id. at 22 (reasoning that "[s]o long as the environment would reasonably be

perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to
be psychologically injurious"). Id.
64Id at23.
e5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957). Section 219 provides in
pertinent part:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment.

(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he
was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation.
Id.
r Anderson, supra note 21, at 1261.
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the employer's "liability derive[d] from the fault of the employee,
regardless of whether the employer was aware of the
harassment., 67 Therefore, post-Meritor courts applied principles
of respondeat superior in cases of actionable conduct, but only for
acts of a supervisor or a worker with agency capacity.68 Liability
based on respondeat superior, which literally means "look to the
man higher up," is usually associated with acts that further the
master's business, and are thus within the scope of the servant's
employment.69
In addition, courts following the directives of the Supreme Court
in Meritor found liability for employers based on hostile
environment harassment claims. In the situation where a coworker creates an offensive environment, "courts always
employ[ed] a knowledge standard to assess employer liability,"
where the employer was liable if he or she knew or should have
known of the misconduct but failed to take remedial action. 70
Therefore, an employer was liable for the harassing conduct of a
co-worker under a negligence or recklessness standard because of
its own misconduct in failing to perceive and 7take corrective
action, and not under a theory of vicarious liability. '

See Anderson, supra note 21, at 1261. See also Miller v. Bank of America,
600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit stated that "respondeat superior
does apply here [where] the action complained of was that of a supervisor,
authorized to hire, fire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in or
recommend such actions, although what the supervisor is said to have done
violated company policy." Id. at 213.
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 67. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1986).
"The Commission will examine the circumstances of the particular employment
relationship and the job functions performed by the individual in determining
whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or agency capacity." Id.
61 See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS
67

§ 69, at 500 (5th ed. 1984). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311-12 (6th
ed. 1990), which defines "respondeat superior" to mean "let the master answer."
Id. at 1311. It further defines the doctrine as follows: "a master is liable in
certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal for those of his
agent." Id. at 1311-12.
70 Anderson, supra note 21, at 1262. See also Franklin,
supra note 5, at 1553.
"Constructive knowledge is judged by the pervasiveness, severity, and openness
of the harassment." Id.
7 Anderson, supra note 21, at 1276.
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However, courts had much more difficulty in applying uniform
standards when it came to the situation of a hostile work
environment created by a supervisor. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that ever since they held in Meritor that
the Restatement (Second) of Agency should be utilized in this area,
the circuits have struggled to identify with a uniform standard to
evaluate an employer's responsibility for the abusive conduct of its
supervisor.7
It was not until twelve years after the Meritor decision that the
United States Supreme Court provided further assistance in
determining employer liability for hostile work environments
created by supervisors. In two landmark cases, both decided on
the last day of the 1997-98 term, the Court all but abandoned the
distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual
harassment.73 In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,74 and
Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,75 the Court instead chose to base
employer liability on whether the harasser is a supervisory
employee or a non-supervisory employee. Again, the Court relied
on agency law principles holding an employer responsible at law
for its agent's torts if the agent was aided by the existence of the
agency relationship. 76 The Burlington Court followed the lead of
Meritor in using the Restatement (Second) of Agency as the
starting point for its analysis of the principles of agency.77
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785 (1998) (stating that
"Courts of Appeals have struggled to derive manageable standards to govern

employer liability for hostile environment harassment perpetrated by
supervisory employees").

73See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (stating
that the labels quidpro quo and hostile work environment are not controlling for
purposes of establishing employer liability); see also Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
74524 U.S. 742 (1998).
75524 U.S. 775 (1998).
7 6See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 754. Justice Kennedy made clear that the Court,
in deciding whether an employer is vicariously liable when a supervisor creates
a hostile work environment, "turn[ed] to principles of agency law, for the term
'employer' is defined under Title VII to include 'agents."' Id. Justice Kennedy
further pointed out that "Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title
VII based on agency principles." ldL

7d. at 755 (stating that "the Restatement (Second) of Agency ...
is a useful
beginning point for a discussion of general agency principles").
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The Court set forth identical holdings in Burlington and
Faragher,assessing employer liability for a supervisor's sexual
harassment of a subordinate even if the employer knew nothing
about the harassment at the time it occurred.7 8 Both decisions
rested on in-depth analyses of principles of agency law that later
formed the basis for employer liability. 79 First, the Supreme Court
definitively ruled that "sexual harassment by a supervisor is not
conduct within the scope of employment;" therefore, liability
based on section 219(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
was put aside.8 ° The Court then considered liability based on the
employer's negligence in failing to perceive a supervisor's sexual
harassment occurring outside the scope of employment.8 In such
cases, even though the supervisor acted purely with personal
motives, the employer's negligence is the cause of the
harassment.8 2 Therefore, "[n]egligence
sets a minimum standard
83
for employer liability under Title VII."
Then the Court turned to an assessment of potential vicarious
liability for the acts of a supervisor. 84 Subsection 219(2)(d) of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency provides that:
A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his
servants acting outside the scope of their
employment, unless ...the servant purported to act
See id. at 765 (holding that "[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to
a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee"); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998)
7 See id. at 758; see also Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801
(1998).
80 Id. at 757.
8, Id. at 759 (stating that "[a]n employer is negligent with respect to sexual
78

harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop
it"). Id.
82 id.
"3 Id.
Under Section 219(2)(b), "an employer is liable when the tort is
attributable to the employer's own negligence." Id.
84 Id. "Subsection 219(2)(d) concerns vicarious liability for intentional torts

committed by an employee when the employee uses apparent authority (the
apparent authority standard), or when the employee 'was aided in accomplishing
the tort by the existence of the agency relation' (the aided in the agency relation
standard)."). Id.
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or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was
reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided
in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation. 5

In accordance with this principle, the Court noted that usually a
supervisor's harassing conduct involves "misuse of actual power,
not the false impression of its existence,"' 86 and that therefore a
basis of liability cannot be grounded in the reliance upon apparent
authority. The Court instead looked to the "aided in the agency
relation" rule, where "[plroximity and regular contact [in the
's
workplace] may afford a captive pool of potential victims., 7
Here, it found the implications to be too far-reaching in that the
mere existence of the employment relation would subject
employers to vicarious liability for acts of co-workers as well. The
Court explicitly required something more than the agency relation
itself to establish liability, and it found that requirement satisfied in
the class of cases in which a supervisor's actions against a
subordinate could be characterized as a tangible employment
action.88 This presupposes that the actor had supervisory or agency
authority to carry out the change in employment status. s9
Therefore, any action taken by a supervisor that is classified as a
tangible employment action is deemed to be the act of the
employer under Title VII, imposing liability.
The Court found it more difficult, however, to exact the agency
relation standard in situations where there is no tangible
employment action, but harassing conduct occurs nonetheless. 9
sRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 219 (2)(d) (1958) (emphasis added).

"r'Burlington,524 U.S. at 759.
mid at 760.

'0 Id at 761-62 (reasoning that "[w]hen a supervisor makes a tangible
employment decision, there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted
absent the agency relation.").

9Idat 762. 'Tangible employment actions fall within the special province of
the supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a
distinct class of agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees

under his or her control." Id
90 Id (holding that "tangible employment action taken by a supervisor
becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer.").
9'Id. at 763.
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The Court did note that this type of harassment, which indeed
creates a hostile work environment, is particularly insidious in that
the "supervisor's power and authority invests his or her harassing
conduct with a particular threatening character, and in this sense, a
csupervisor always, is.aided by..the.agency relation. 92 The Court in
Faragherclarified this point by suggesting that an employee who
may not hesitate to deal with the harassing conduct of a fellow
of a
worker, may be reluctant to call into question the acts
3
will.
at
dismiss
or
demote
to
power
the
has
supervisor who
The Court was careful to point out that even though vicarious
liability for employers may result, Meritor's mandate that
employer liability not be automatic would still be honored.94
Borrowing the avoidable consequences doctrine from tort law, the
Court laid down a rule of vicarious liability limited by the
availability of an affirmative defense. The holdings of Burlington
and Faragherexplicitly state:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a
victimized employee for an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over
the employee. When no tangible employment
action is taken, a defending employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject
to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 95
The affirmative defense created by the Supreme Court to
preclude liability is only available for employers when no tangible
employment action was taken. 96 The Court once again looked to
the objectives and purposes of Title VII in creating this defense
and noted that its requirements will better serve the remedial
ld. "[I]t is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with
the employer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on

subordinates." Id. (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
77 (Marshall, J., concurring)).

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998).
941d. at

804.
5Id. at 807; see also Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765.

9

96 ,
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aspects of the statute in preventing sexual harassment from
occurring in the first place.97 By making employers more aware of
the extent of the problem and the possible solutions, statutory
policy will in fact be implemented.9 The composite defense is
made up of two elements. First, an employer must show that it
took reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing conduct.99 While the absence of a company's antiharassment policy and procedures is not totally fatal in arguing
reasonable care, it will be taken into account in establishing
whether the employer's duty was breached.'tm
Second, the
defendant must show that the plaintiff/victim unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any opportunities presented by the employer
that might have avoided harm.10 ' Usually, this may be satisfied if
the employer can show that the victim never resorted to complaint
procedures instituted in the workplace.
In sum, under the new standards set forth in Burlington and
Faragher,an employer can be held vicariously liable for a hostile
work environment created by a supervisor. This liability is subject
to an affirmative defense if the employer had no knowledge of the
conduct and if no tangible employment action was taken. As a
defense, the employer must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and that the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective measures available that could have avoided harm.' °2 To
at 805-06.
9s Id at 806.
Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; see also Faragher,524 U.S. at 807; see also
97Id.

Franklin, supra note 5, at 1554. In addressing the issue of promptness:

[Ain employer can be assured that it will escape liability only if it
takes appropriate corrective action within hours of discovering
severely harassing conduct or within days of discovering subtly
harassing or questionable conduct. It can be assured of having
corrective action deemed prompt absent a complaint only if it acts
with similar haste after observing severe, overtly sexual conduct
and if it affirmatively investigates after observing more innocuous
conduct to ensure that it is not creating a hostile environment.
Id

0oo
Burlington,524 U.S. at 765.

101 Id

102id
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limit liability, employers should implement an anti-harassment
policy with adequate procedures to attempt to prevent and correct
promptly any harassing conduct. In situations where a tangible
employment action was taken, it is irrelevant whether the employer
maintained a policy or whether the victim complained. 0 3 In
situations where a co-worker/non-supervisory employee creates a
hostile environment, employer liability is predicated upon whether
the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed
to correct it. 1°4 Under this traditional knowledge/correction
standard, the burden is on the plaintiff to show a lack of reasonable
care in perceiving the harassment and adequately addressing it.
IV.

TITLE IX AND SCHOOL LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT

The essential language of Title IX mandates: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."' 0 5 The United States Supreme Court
has noted that it is the express purpose of Title IX to prevent
discrimination by entities using federal funding as well as to
protect citizens of the United States from discrimination. '0 Title
IX has been touted by legal scholars as the "most significant law
nationally advancing equality of opportunity and the prohibition of
sex discrimination in educational institutions, including athletic
103

Id. Actions such as an undesirable reassignment, demotion, or discharge

will not afford the employer with an affirmative defense. Id.
See Franklin, supra note 5, at 1540-41. The employer must promptly
correct the hostile situation in order to avoid liability. Id.
'05 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, §§ 901-909, as amended,
104

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1999).
See also Meliti, supra note 3, at 222-23.
"Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 as an
extension of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964. In essence, the statute captures the
strong attitudes of Congress and the Supreme Court toward discrimination based
on sex and applies it to public schools." Id. at 222.
'o8 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) (reasoning that
"Congress wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory
practices... [and] to provide individual citizens effective protection against
those practices").

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss1/7

18

Mulry: Sexual Harassment

1999]

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

programs and activities, that are recipients of federal funds."' 7 It
was specifically designed to secure for every individual an equal

educational opportunity by eliminating discrimination on the basis
of sex.lms Therefore, Title IX imposes a duty on federally funded

schools to ensure that discriminatory conduct such as harassment
does not prevent a student from attaining the benefits of
education.'0 9

Sexual harassment in the field of education is indeed a
problem.1 Studies reveal that harassing conduct is an everyday
The
occurrence at our nation's schools and universities."'
opportunity for such harassment abounds due to the vulnerability
of young students and the disproportionate power structure that

'w Diane Heckman, Lowrey v. Texas A & M University Systems: Title IX Visa-vis Title VII Sex Discriminationand Retaliation in EducationalEmployment,
124 Ed. Law Rep. 753,753 (1998).
'0o 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1999).
109 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, §§ 901-909, as amended,
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1999).
"0 See Hauser, ed., supra note 30, at 230-31. "While sexual harassment in the
workplace has recently come under greater scrutiny, the problem of sexual
harassment in the schools has been largely ignored." L at 230. See also John
T. Wolohan, Sexual Harassmentof Student Athletes and the Law: A Review of
the Rights Afforded Students, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 339, 353 (1995).
"Sexual harassment of students is a serious problem that cannot be ignored by
school administrators." Ia
il See Hauser, ed., supra note 30, at 230-31. "Every day in schools across the
country, harassment interferes with girls' educational opportunities." Id. at 230.
In a 1992 study by NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and the Wellesley
College Center for Research on Women, surveying over forty-two hundred girls,
ranging in age from nine to nineteen years old, it was revealed that:
[T]he majority of girls experience both verbal and physical sexual
harassment: 89 percent reported receiving sexual comments,
looks, or gestures, and 83 percent were touched, pinched, or
grabbed. When harassment occurs, it is not a one-time-only
event: 39 percent reported that they were sexually harassed at
school on a daily basis in the last year. Also, harassment is a
public event: other people were present at over two-thirds of the
reported incidents. Girls are most often harassed by fellow
students, but 4 percent of the girls reported harassment by
teachers, administrators, and other school staff.
Id. at 231.
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2
necessarily exists between teachers and their students."'
Furthermore, there is an increasing propensity for sexual
harassment to occur between coaches and student athletes."13 And,
of particular and timely significance is the question of school
liability for peer (student-to-student) sexual harassment. One must
note that the United States Supreme Court only began to recognize
that an implied right of action exists for students under Title IX
over the past two decades." 4 More significantly, the Supreme
C61%rt has only very, recently held that an implied right of action
under Title IX can support a claim for money damages."s
Ironically, the United States Supreme Court has imposed a much
more stringent standard for school liability than was set forth in the
Title VII workplace sexual harassment cases." 6 Indeed, after the
Supreme Court's decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District,"7 students found it difficult to prove supervisory
liability for sexual harassment under Title IX." 8

12

See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 297-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that a

teacher exerts even greater authority over young students than an
employer/supervisor does over an employee).
113 See Robin Finn, Growth in Women's Sports Stirs HarassmentIssue, N.Y.
TvES, Mar. 7, 1999, § 1, at 1. "The coach-athlete relationship is based on
trust." Id. "It's all about emotions, about trust and about the body, [a]nd when
scholarships come into play, it's about money, too." Id. "When you put a male
in a position of power where he can manipulate something of real meaning to an
athlete, such as playing time or a scholarship, then add in the possibility of a
young girl who may have a crush, you've got an extremely dangerous mix." Id.
"14 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
689 (1979) (stating
that "the Court of Appeals reached the wrong conclusion and that [Cannon] does
have a statutory right to pursue her claim that respondents rejected her
application on the basis of her sex"); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 65 (1992) (recognizing that in Cannon, "the Court held that
Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of action").
11 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76
(holding that "a
damages remedy is available for an action brought to enforce Title IX").
"" See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11 th Cir. 1997),
rev. 'd, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
117

118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).

118

See Michael A. Zwibelman, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983

Claims, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1484 (1998); see also Diane Heckman, On the
Eve of Title IX's 25th Anniversary: Sex Discrimination in the Gym and
Classroom, 21 NOVA L. REV. 545, 551-52 (1997) [hereinafter Heckman, 25th
Anniversary].
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As in a Title VII analysis, sexual harassment can form the basis
of liability under Title IX for either quid pro quo or hostile
environment sexual harassment." 9 Quid pro quo harassment
occurs in the educational context when, for example, a teacher
expressly conditions grades on the receipt of sexual favors or a
coach grants or withholds benefits, such as scholarships,
contingent on an athlete's willingness to submit to such
demands. 2°' Similarly, one student may extort sexual demands by
threatening sabotage of another student's project, or divulging of
unsavory information. Moreover, Title IX hostile learning
environment sexual harassment, which is created by a teacher's
harassment, is clearly actionable.' 2 ' Additionally, claims of hostile
learning environments caused by peer sexual harassment are of
alarming frequency.
The country just recently celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary
of Title IX and while much ground has been gained in litigating
these issues under the statute's mandates, it still remains an enigma
in many ways.'22 President Clinton ushered in federal government
activities commemorating the anniversary with a caveat to schools:
Every school and every educational program that
receives federal assistance in the entire country
must understand that complying with Title IX is not
optional. It is the law and must be enforced ....
[W]e're here to celebrate the God-given talent of
every woman and girl who has been benefited by
it ....
[T]itle IX has had a beneficial impact on
every American citizen. If we've learned anything
in the last twenty-five years since Title IX, it is that

"9 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1415 (1 lIth Cir.
1997),
cert. granted, 524 U.S. 980 (1998).
120 See John T. Wolohan, Sexual Harassment of Student Athletes and the
Law:

A Review of the Rights Afforded Students, 5 SEToN HALL J. SPORT L. 339, 342
(1995).
123 See Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp.
1288, 1293

(N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that a hostile environment claim under Title IX is
permitted).
122 See generally Heckman, 25th Anniversary, supra note 118, at 546.
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However, to what extent can Title IX be enforced? The Office
for Civil Rights [hereinafter "OCR"] in the U.S. Department of
Education is the governmental entity responsible for enforcement
and compliance with the mandates of Title IX. 24 A student may
file a complaint of harassment with the OCR, which then results in
an investigation of the school district or university. 125 If the OCR
does find that discrimination exists, it will attempt to negotiate
voluntary compliance with the educational entity, at the risk of that
2
entity's loss of federal financial assistance for non-compliance.1
The filing of a complaint via the OCR does not preclude the
availability of a civil lawsuit and money damages under Title
IX. 127 However, courts are still trying to define the contours of
liability for an educational institution under Title IX, and to
determine whether that standard should differ if the perpetrator of
harassing conduct is an educational employee or another student. 128
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 29 the United States
Supreme Court rendered its first decision addressing Title IX.
Cannon involved a female plaintiff who claimed that she was
denied admission to two medical schools because of her sex.' 3°
'23 Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Concise ChronologicalTwenty-Five Year
History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and Intercollegiate Athletics, 7
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 391 (1997) [hereinafter Heckman, Scoreboard]
(quoting William J. Clinton, White House Press Release, June 17, 1997).
124 34 C.F.R. §100 App.
B (1999).
'25 34 C.F.R. §106.8 (1999).
126 Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity
in Intercollegiate
Athletics During 1992-93: Defining the 'Equal Opportunity' Standard, 1994
DET. C.L. REv. 953, 955 (1994) [hereinafter Heckman, Explosion]. "The OCR
is responsible for providing technical assistance, investigating administrative
complaints, initiating compliance reviews and referring cases to the Department
of Justice." Id.
127 Franklin,503 U.S.
at 75.
'28 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1670 (1999)
(recognizing that "the scope of liability in private damages actions under Title
IX is circumscribed by Pennhurst's requirement that funding recipients have
notice of their potential liability").

129441 U.S. 677 (1979).
'30 Id. at 680.
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The Court engaged in a detailed analysis of the legislative history
of the statute to conclude that Congress surely intended it to confer
a private right of action for discrimination on the basis of sex.' 3
The Court also looked at the objectives of Title IX and emphasized
its goal of protecting citizens from discriminatory practices by
avoiding support of such practices with federal funds.'as The
Court held that although Title IX is silent as to whether there exists
a private right of action, nevertheless, there is an implied right of
action to seek redress for a violation of Title IX.'3 Thus, the
Cannon Court "opened a new door for the enforcement of Title
ix.,134

It was not until the Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnent
County Public Schools35 that Title IX began to bare its teeth. In
that seminal Title IX case, which was a unanimous Supreme Court
decision, money damages were made available to redress a
teacher's sexual harassment of a student and the school's
intentional failure to take remedial action.' 36 In Franklin, a female
high school student alleged that a teacher subjected her to
continuous sexual harassment, including explicit sexual
conversations, forcible kissing in the school parking lot, and even
coercive intercourse in a school office. 137 Although school
officials became aware of and investigated the misconduct,
"teachers and administrators took no action to halt it and
discouraged [the student] from pressing charges against [the
teacher]."'' m The school dropped its investigation of the incidents

31 d

at 699.

132 1d

at 708-09 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).

1-3Id. at
'3

736.
Meliti, supranote 3, at 224.

'35

503 U.S. 60 (1992). See also Heckman, Explosion, supra note 126, at 954

(noting that Franklin was decided in 1992, the twentieth anniversary of the

enactment of Title IX). Ms. Heckman further noted that the twentieth
anniversary of Title IX was voted the third most important sports story of 1992
by a poll of New York Times sportswriters. Id.
'3 6 Id. at 75.
'7Id. at 63. "Respondent Gwinnett County School District operates the high

school and receives federal funds." Id.
'8 Id at 63-64.
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of harassment when the teacher subsequently resigned. 3
Thereafter, the student filed charges with the OCR but was
disappointed when, after finding that the Gwinnett school district
had violated Title IX, the OCR dropped further inquiry upon the
school district's promise to implement a grievance procedure. 4I
Upon bringing a civil action in federal district court under Title
IX, the student/plaintiff in Franklin was once again discouraged
when the action was dismissed on the ground that Title IX did not
authorize ah award of money damages.' 4' The dismissal was later
affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, holding that while a private right
of action exists under Title IX, an award of money damages could
not be sustained. 42 The Eleventh Circuit justified its holding by
noting that Title IX was patterned after Title VI to give sex the
same protection as race, color or national origin, 43 and that past
court decisions had denied an award of money damages to Title VI
claims.' 4
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, like Title
VI, Title IX is Spending Clause legislation and, therefore, it could
not allow a right of recovery of money damages
where Congress
45
relief.
such
for
provided
explicitly
not
had

I39at 64. Indeed, the resignation of defendant, Hill, was premised on the
Id.
condition
that the school district would drop all matters pending against him. Id.
,40 /dat 65.
14'Id. at 64.
142 Id. at 65 (reasoning that without an express provision
by Congress or
direction from the Supreme Court, an action for monetary damages could not be
sustained for an alleged intentional violation of Title IX).
143See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). "Title
IX was
patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" and "the two statutes
use identical language to describe the benefited class." Id. at 688 n.7 (stating
that both statutes form a significant "part of the civil rights enforcement
scheme" that Congress has enacted pursuant to its "obligation to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment by eliminating entirely.., discrimination") (quoting
122 Cong. Rec. 31, 372 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy)).
144 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 64.
"Citing as binding precedent Drayden v.
Needville Independent School Dist., 642 F.2d 129 (CA5 1981).... the court
concluded that Title VI did not support a claim for monetary damages." Id.
145Id. at 64-65. "Under such statutes, relief may frequently be limited to that
which is equitable in nature, with the recipient of federal funds thus retaining the
option of terminating such receipt in order to rid itself of an injunction." Id. at
65.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts'
rulings, finding instead that there is a presumption of the
availability of all remedies.'4 Furthermore, the Court stated that
"where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute
provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts
47
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done."'
IX and concluded that
The Court applied this principle to Title
148
recovered.
fully
be
could
damages
money
The Court explicitly disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's denial
of a compensatory award based on the limitations of Spending
Clause legislation.149 It pointed out that the whole idea of not
allowing money damages, in cases of unintentional violations, is
that the entity receiving federal funds lacks notice that it will be
liable for a monetary award. 50 In Franklin, an intentional
discrimination was alleged; therefore, there was no problem with
notice.' 5 ' Moreover, the Court applied the principles set forth in
Meritor to determine that sexual harassment of a student falls
within the purview of sexual discrimination under Title IX. ' 52 The
Court stated without question that:
Title VII placed on the Gwinnett County Public
Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of
sex, and "when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."
We believe the same rule should apply when a
teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.
'4

d

at 66 (citing Davis v.Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979), which held

that the Court "presume[s] the availability of all appropriate remedies unless

Congress has expressly indicated otherwise").
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). "From the earliest
years of the Republic, the Court has recognized the power of the Judiciary to
award appropriate remedies to redress injuries actionable in federal court,
'47ld.(quoting

although it did not always distinguish clearly between a right to bring suit and a
remedy available under such a right." Id.
at 76.
'41L
49
1 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75.
'5Id.
151iL

' Id. at 75.
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Congress surely did not intend for federal moneys
to be expended to support the5 intentional
actions it
3
proscribe.
to
statute
by
sought
This was indeed a landmark decision for victims of sexual
harassment, one that would make school administrators sit up and
take notice. "No longer does a plaintiff have to tolerate sexual
harassment by a teacher or coach. If the school fails to act, the
plaintiff -can now sue to collect compensatory damages for any
deliberate violations of Title IX.' '
The decision in Franklin
brought about a noticeable increase in the number of Title IX
lawsuits brought by students claiming sexual harassment by school
employees and as witnessed in recent years, it served as a "catalyst
for the enormous explosion of Title IX litigation."1 55 It has also
paved the way for assessing school district liability for sexual
harassment claims involving coaches and peers. 5 6
However, in the years following Franklin, courts have applied
conflicting standards in assessing a school's liability for its
employees' actionable conduct. 5 7 Indeed, some courts have
adopted standards that limit the amount of compensatory damages
awarded under Title IX. 58 These cases are significant because
they formed the basis upon which the United States Supreme Court
justified a more stringent standard for school liability in Gebser v.

'53

Id. at 75. (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64

(1986)).
Wolohan, supra note 120, at 353. "A plaintiff can win a sexual harassment
suit if they can demonstrate that they were subjected to a hostile or abusive
environment." Id.
'55 Heckman, Explosion, supra note 126, at 1022.
156 See Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103
F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996); see also
Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir.
1997); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996); Rosa
H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
157 Compare Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d
495, 514 (6th Cir.
1996) (determining Title IX sexual harassment liability by applying agency
principles), with Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d
1014, 1034 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying an actual notice standard for determining
school liability in sexual harassment cases).
158 See, e.g., Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996);
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
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Lago Vista Independent School District.'59 For example, in
Canutillo Independent School District v. Leija,'60 a second-grade
student brought a Title IX action against the school district based
on allegations of egregious sexual harassment by her physical
education/health teacher.16 1
A jury awarded the plaintiff
compensatory damages in excess of a million dollars.'62 The Fifth
Circuit reversed the jury's award of damages, claiming that
recovery under Title IX requires actual notice of the harassment by
a school district official. 163
The Fifth Circuit narrowed its application of Title IX even
further in the case of Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School
District.'6 In Rosa H., the mother of a fifteen year old female high
school student brought a Title IX case of sexual harassment against
the school district, claiming that her daughter and the school's
karate teacher had an ongoing sexual relationship in violation of
Title TX.1 65 The Fifth Circuit once again reversed the plaintiff's
damage award, holding that the school district liability could only
be based on actual notice of threat of harm.' 68 The court reasoned
that the actual notice standard would better serve the settled
principle that "Title IX generates liability only for intentional
wrongs."''7
The United States Supreme Court seemed to adopt this very
restrictive interpretation of Title IX when it decided Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District.'6 The Gebser decision
159

118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (concerning liability of educational institutions for

sexual harassment of students by employees); see also Doe v. Lago Vista Indep.
Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1224 (5th Cir. 1997).
10 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id at 395.
Id at 396. To be exact, the jury awarded plaintiff $1.4 million in
compensatory damages. Id.
'0ld at 400.
''

162

106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
at 651. The Court found that the karate teacher "had sex with [the
student] at his house on a regular basis in December, January, and February,
often during the school day. When [the student] insisted that she would get in
trouble for missing school, [the karate teacher] assured her that the school did
not6 require her to attend so long as she was with him." Id. at 650.
16 Id. at 648.
'6 Id at 659-60.
6 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
'6

'6 Id.
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has met with much criticism since its resolution last term.' 6 9 Some
have argued that the Court's ruling in Gebser is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's previous interpretations of Title VII, Title IX,
and Agency Law, reasoning that it is directly contrary to the public
sexual discrimination
policy Congress intended, to wit, prohibiting
7
in federally funded educational programs. ,
In Gebser, the plaintiff, Alida Starr Gebser, was the subject of
improper sexual conduct by a Lago Vista School District teacher,
Frank Waldrop.' 71 Ms. Gebser first met Waldrop at a book
discussion group when she was a thirteen-year-old, eighth-grade
student. 172 During these sessions, "Waldrop often made sexually
suggestive comments to the students."'' 73 Entering high school the
following year, Ms. Gebser was assigned to one of Waldrop's
classes. 74 Throughout that year and the next, Waldrop initiated
sexual contact with Ms. Gebser, maintaining their liaison at all
times off school property. 75
According to Ms. Gebser's
testimony, she never complained to school officials, even though
she knew that Waldrop was doing something wrong, because she
did not want to lose him as her teacher. 7r During that time, the
169

See generally Federal Statutes and Regulations - Civil Rights Acts, 112

HARV. L. REV. 335 (1998) (hereinafter FederalStatutesl; Marley S. Weiss, The

Supreme Court 1997-1998 Labor and Employment Law Term (Part I): The
Sexual Harassment Decisions, 14 LAB. LAW 261 (1998); Michael A.
Zwibelman, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims, 65 U. CHI.L.
REV. 1465 (1998); Linda Greenhouse, School Districts Given A Shield in Sex
Harassment,N.Y. TWiES, June 23, 1998, at Al.
170 See Federal Statutes, supra note 169, at 335, 340.
"By failing to apply
agency principles in the Title IX context, the Court departed from its previous
interpretations of Title IX, Title VII, and agency law and reached a result that
will ill-serve Title IX's goal of protecting school children from discrimination."
Id.
17 Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993. The Court noted that
"Lago Vista received
federal funds at all pertinent times." Id.
172 Id.
173 id.
174

Id.
Id.

"Their relationship continued through the summer and into the
following school year and they often had intercourse during class time, although
never on school property." Id.
176 Id. (noting that Alida Gebser testified "that while she
realized that
Waldrop's conduct was improper, she was uncertain how to react and she
wanted to continue having him as a teacher").
175
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high school principal received unrelated complaints from parents
of other students who alleged that he made offensive remarks in
the classroom."'7 Without admitting guilt, Waldrop nevertheless
apologized for any offense taken and promised it would never
happen again. 17
The principal did nothing more than warn
Waldrop at that time, and never reported the confrontation to the
district's Title IX coordinator.1 79 A couple of months later, a
police officer found Waldrop and Gebser having sexual intercourse
and subsequently arrested Waldrop.' 80 Thereafter, the school
district fired Waldrop and the Texas Education Agency revoked
his teaching license.'8 ' It is noteworthy to point out that at all
relevant times, the Lago Vista School District did not have an antiharassment policy, nor did it have an effective grievance procedure
in place to address situations such as this.
In a suit brought by Gebser and her mother for compensatory
and punitive damages under Title IX, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and
various state law claims, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Lago Vista, reasoning that the school could
not be held to a violation of a policy of discrimination, if indeed, it
had no notice of the discriminatory conduct. s2 The Fifth Circuit,
relying on Canutillo and Rosa H., affirmed and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.'83
In a 5-4 decision, with Justice O'Connor writing the majority
opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the application of vicarious
liability principles which would have rendered the Lago Vista
177
8

Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.

7 iLd.

'7 9d.
"The principal... advised Waldrop to be careful about his classroom
comments and told the school guidance counselor about the meeting, but he did
not report the parents' complaint to Lago Vista's superintendent, who was the
district's Title IX coordinator." Id

181 Id.

"'

ld. at 1993-94. The court reasoned that "the statute 'was enacted to counter

policies of discrimination... in federally funded education programs,' and that
'only if school administrators have some type of notice of the gender

discrimination and fail to respond in good faith can the discrimination be
interpreted as a policy of the school district."' Id. at 1994 (citing App. to Pet.

for Cert. 6a-7a).
'

3

See Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir.

1997).
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school system liable under Title IX.84 Indeed, the Court refused to
apply the "knew or should have known" standard that had gained
acceptance under Title VII employer liability cases. 8 5 Instead, the
Court viewed Title IX as a contract between the school district and
the federal govemment whereby the school district promises
compliance with the mandates of the statute as a condition on
receipt of federal funds. 86 The Court expressly held that:
[a] damages remedy will not lie under Title IX
unless an official who at a minimum has authority
to address the alleged discrimination and to institute
corrective measures on the recipient's behalf has
actual knowledge of discrimination in the
recipient's programs and fails adequately to
respond ....[For school districts to be liable], the
response must187 be deliberate indifference to
discrimination.
Petitioner Gebser argued that because the Court in Franklin had
compared teacher-student harassment with that prohibited by Title
VII in the supervisor-employee context, agency principles should
similarly be applied in Title IX cases.' 88 Gebser suggested
Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2000.
See id. at 1995-96.
186See id. at 1997. In this regard, Justice O'Connor likened
Title IX to Title
VI as follows:
The statute was modeled after Title VI ...which is parallel to Title IX
except that it prohibits race discrimination, not sex discrimination, and
applies in all programs receiving federal funds, not only in education
programs.... The two statutes operate in the same manner, conditioning
an offer of federal funding on a promise by the recipient not to
discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the
Government and the recipient of funds.
Id.
187Id. at 1999. "The premise, in other words, is an official decision
by the
recipient not to remedy the violation." Id.
188 Id. at 1995.
Petitioners relied on the following passage in Franklin to
support their argument:
Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public Schools
the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
18
185
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alternatively that the principles of respondeat superior or, at a
minimum, constructive notice were standards that would allow a
money damages recovery.' 89 The Court rejected this argument
finding that the intent of Congress would be obviated if they
allowed a money damages recovery against a school district using
principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice of a
teacher's sexual harassment.' 90 Justice O'Connor pointed out that
the Court's willingness to apply agency principles in the Title VII
context was premised on the language of Title VII itself, which
expressly prohibits discrimination in the workplace as against an
"employer."' 9 ' Title VII further defines "employer" to include
"any agent," a reference found lacking in Title IX. Indeed,
because Title IX does not define an educational institution as an
"agent," it "does not expressly call for application of agency
principles."'9
To further distinguish Title VII and Title IX, the Court made
clear that Title VII expressly provides for a private right of action
for individuals whose rights have been violated, while under Title
IX, a private right of action is purely a construction of the courts. 93
Moreover, Title VII explicitly awards relief in the form of
monetary damages while Title IX has no such legislative
expression. Justice O'Connor reasoned that because Congress did
not specifically define the scope of available remedies under Title
IX, and because an implied private right of action exists, the Court
has the power to determine what remedy is appropriate under Title

supervisor discriminate[s] on the basis of sex." We believe the same rule
should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.

Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (quoting
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
'8 9 Id.

'0oId.

at 1995.

at 1997 (stating that "it would frustrate the purposes of Title IX to

permit a damages recovery against a school district for a teacher's sexual
harassment of a student based on principles of respondeat superior or

constructive notice, i.e., without actual notice to a school district official").
'9'
Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1996.
92
1 Id.

'9
Id. "With respect to Title IX, however, the private right of action is
judicially implied." Id. See also Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677

(1979).
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To find a remedial scheme that fits within the parameters of
the statute, the Court examined the statute, taking care not to
frustrate its congressional purposes. 9 5 In so doing, Justice
O'Connor remarked:
"[I]t does not appear that Congress
contemplated unlimited recovery in damages against a funding
recipient where
the recipient is unaware of discrimination in its
196
programs."
The majority indicated other differences between Title VII and
Title IX, explicit in the statutory language. Title VII asserts an
"outright prohibition" against discrimination, whereas Title IX
promises to protect individuals against such practices as a
condition on receipt of federal moneys. 97 In addition, Title IX
expressly confers upon administrative agencies that are responsible
for disbursing funds to educational institutions the authority to
strictly enforce its mandates.' 98 Thus, agencies have the power to
terminate such funding; however, they can only do so after they
have advised the recipient of its non-compliance, and allowed
ample opportunity for the recipient to remedy the discrimination.' 99
Therefore, the entire enforcement scheme is premised on "actual
notice to officials of the funding recipient., 200 Such notice assures
that educational funding will not be diverted from beneficial uses,
especially when the recipient is unaware of discrimination inherent
in its programs.20 '
IX.194

194

Id. (stating that "[b]ecause the private right of action under Title IX is

judicially implied, we have a measure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial
scheme that best comports with the statute").
'95 id.

at 1997.

'9 Id. at 1997. "Applying those principles here, we conclude that it would
'frustrate the purposes' of Title IX to permit a damages recovery against a
school district for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student based on principles
of respondeat superior or constructive notice, i.e. without actual notice to a
school district official." Id. See also Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist.,
106 F.3d 648 (C.A.5 1997). "When the school board accepted federal funds, it
agreed not to discriminate on the basis of sex. We think it unlikely that it further
agreed to suffer liability whenever its employees discriminate on the basis of
sex." Id. at 654.
1MId.
'9

Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1998.

199Id.
2 00
id.
201 id. at

1999.
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In applying the majority's new standard to the facts in Gebser,
the Court noted that while the Lago Vista School District may have
had notice of Waldrop's inappropriate language in class, such
knowledge was insufficient to put an appropriate school official on
notice of the more egregious conduct complained of therein.2m
The majority made clear that an "appropriate person" under the
statute's remedial scheme is an official who, at the very least, has
'2
the authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination. 03
Therefore, Waldrop was not the appropriate person to effect
remediation and his knowledge of his own wrongdoing was
irrelevant to the analysis. 204 Accordingly, the Court affirmed
summary judgment for the school district, noting that the school
district did not have actual notice of Waldrop's conduct.203 Indeed,
when school officials finally became aware of Waldrop's
malfeasance, the school district immediately terminated his
employment, thus ending the discrimination. 2 6 Furthermore, the
Court did not equate the school district's absence of grievance
procedures with a finding of deliberate indifference. z7
Justice Stevens' dissent is particularly noteworthy because of its
strong language and vehement disagreement with the majority. 20
Justice Stevens concluded that the majority's newly devised
standard is antithetical to established precedent and ill-serving of
congressional intent under Titie IX.2* He argued that Congress'
acquiescence in the Court's previous interpretations of Title IX in
Cannon and Franklin is indicative of its approval of monetary
damages for victims of a teacher's sexual harassment. 2 '0 Justice
Stevens further contended that the Court had previously construed
Id. at 2000. "Where a school district's liability rests on actual notice
principles, however, the knowledge of the wrongdoer himself is not pertinent to
the analysis?' Id.
2o3Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999.
2Id.
205 id.

at 2000.

206d
207

Id. (stating "the failure to promulgate a grievance procedure does not itself

constitute 'discrimination' under Title IX.").
20s Id. at 2001 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority is not being
faithful
to precedents or to their duty to interpret congressional commands).
2 9
0 Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 2004.
210 Id.
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Title IX expansively, so as to give it "a sweep as broad as its
language." 2 ' Moreover, he argued that the use of passive verbs in
Title IX is indicative of Congress' intent to give it an even broader
reading than Title 212
VII because it focuses on the victim rather than
on the wrongdoer.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens postulated that Waldrop's position
as a secondary school teacher allowed him to use, and indeed
misuse, authority and control over young students. 1 3 He asserted
that such a situation is the typical example of abuse that could only
occur as a result of the agency relationship and authority that a
school district vests in its teachers. 1 4 Thus, in contradistinction to
the majority's view, Justice Stevens concluded that the Lago Vista
School District would be liable under principles of agency law for
harassment perpetrated by Waldrop specifically because "he was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation. 215
Justice Stevens also convincingly argued public policy in his
dissent, noting that the majority's heightened standard under Title
IX would create a disincentive for school districts to deal with
abusive behavior, enabling schools to "insulate themselves from
knowledge about this sort of conduct... [and] claim immunity
from damages liability. '216 His obvious disagreement and
dissatisfaction with the majority's opinion is indeed evident in his
concluding remarks which state:
231

Id. at 2002 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting North Haven Bd. of Educ. v.

Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982)) (further citations omitted).
212 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry
Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1047 (7th Cir. 1997)).
213 Id. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "His gross misuse of that authority
allowed him to abuse his young student's trust." Id.
234 Id. at 2003-04 (stating that "[t]his case presents a paradigmatic example of
a tort that was made possible, that was effected, and that was repeated over a
prolonged period because of the powerful influence that Waldrop had over
Gebser by reason of the authority that his employer, the school district, had
delegated to him") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235 Id. at 2003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236 Id. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Meliti, supra note 3, at 239.
"The articulation of an 'actual notice' creates a comfort zone where principals,
and other school officials, need not thoroughly investigate the conduct of
teachers when informed of inappropriate conduct." Id.
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As a matter of policy, the Court ranks protection of
the school district's purse above the protection of
immature high school students that [Title IX] would
provide. Because those students are members of the
class for whose special benefit Congress enacted
Title IX, that policy choice is not faithful to the
policy making branch of our
intent of the
21 7
Government.

Interestingly, economics may have played a role in the
majority's opinion. In a brief filed on behalf of the Lago Vista
School District, the National School Boards Association warned
the Court that any standard other than an actual notice standard
would have a "devastating financial impact on the nation's public
schools. '21 8 It emphasized that jury awards in harassment cases
could easily exceed one million dollars, whereas many schools
receive considerably less amounts of federal money.219
The Gebser opinion has been the subject of quite a bit of
A
criticism, both in the public realm and in academia.
spokesperson for the National Women's Law Center commented
that the Gebser decision would "make the job of eliminating sexual
harassment in schools more difficult." 220 The group had pointed
out in its brief in Gebser that the logical result of a standard
requiring that the school district have actual notice is that the
school district would most often avoid liability due to the fact that
most victimized students are reluctant to report teacher
Legal commentators have noted stark
harassment.2'
inconsistencies in that the Court "appears willing to hold a
company liable for the welfare of its adult employees whereas the

21

7 1& at 2007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

218

See Greenhouse, supra note 169, at A14.

See id In this case, the Lago Vista School District received $126.000 a
year
220 in federal funding. Id
219

Id.

221

Id (noting that "because many victims of sexual harassment by teachers felt

isolated and afraid to report it, a liability standard that depended on official
knowledge would effectively immunize school districts much of the time").
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Court will not hold a school liable for the welfare of its minor
students. 22 Another scholarly writing astutely points out that:
The Supreme Court's actual knowledge plus
deliberate indifference test for institutional liability
under Title IX will make it extremely difficult for
plaintiffs to meet their burden because sexual
offenders often 'rely on the silence of their victims.'
In other words, the secret and embarrassing nature
of sexual harassment and abuse might make it
unlikely that anyone other than the offender and the
victim will have actual knowledge of the
223
occurrences in question.
PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT: CAN SCHOOLS BE
HELD LIABLE FOR THE HARASSMENT OF ONE
STUDENT BY ANOTHER?

V.

Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments ... [i]t is
required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities... [i]t is the very foundation
Today it is a principal
of good citizenship.
instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values... [i]t is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if... denied the opportunity of an education. Such
an opportunity.., is a right, which must be made
available to all on equal terms.224
These memorable words from the landmark decision of Brown v.
Board of Education225 clearly indicate and proclaim to the country
the inexorable right of our children to equal opportunities in
education. Title IX has had significant impact in advancing
equality of opportunity by prohibiting discrimination on the basis
Meliti, supra note 3, at 238.
Zwibelman, supra note 169, at 1485.
224 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
222

2

23

225

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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of sex in educational institutions that receive federal funds. But,
what happens when a student is impeded in gaining the benefits of
that education by the acts of another student? To what extent will
a school district be held liable for conduct that is clearly sexual
harassment when the actor is not one hired by the school district,
but one to whom the school district owes a similar duty to benefit
by education?2
The United States Supreme Court, in Davis v. Monroe County
227
Board of Education, recently addressed these difficult issues.
Indeed, such questions become more vexatious because "[a]s
everyone who has gone to junior high knows, adolescent boys
'
sometimes harass girls."2
But, what everyone might not know is
that sometimes persistent taunts and lewd behavior by students do
rise to the level of sexual harassment that is legally proscribed. In
such instances of contumacious student-to-student harassment, as
in the Davis case, the nation's Court has now decided that schools
will bear the burden of liability in certain circumstances. Such is
the "new frontier of sexual harassment law."229
In Davis, a mother sued under Title IX on behalf of her daughter,
230
LaShonda Davis, alleging sexual harassment by another student.
Davis claimed that over the course of five months, LaShonda was
harassed by a fellow fifth-grader, a boy, who made lewd comments
and actions that caused the young girl much distraction and distress
in class.221 LaShonda complained, both to her mother and to
school officials, but the teacher and the principal made light of the
boy's conduct, and made no attempts to remedy the situation.232
2
See also Kay P. Kindred, When Equal Opportunity Meets Freedom of
Expression: Student-on-Student Sexual Harassmentand the FirstAmendment in

School, 75 N. DAX. L. Rv. 205 (1999). "[S]chool administrators must seek to
strike a balance between the need to maintain order and the obligation to respect
the right of students to freedom of expression." Id. at 240.
119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
David G. Savage, Will Court Teach Schools A Lesson?, 85-JAN A.B.A. J.

38, 38 (Jan. 1999).
2

= Id

2"0 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 364 (M.D.Ga.

1994).
23 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 1998 WVL
792418 (U.S. 1998) (No. 97-843).
2Id
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After enduring months of repeated sexual harassment, during
which time the school never disciplined the harasser, LaShonda's
grades, once A's and B's, fell to below average, and she claimed
that her emotional well-being was also being compromised.233
When LaShonda approached the principal for help, she was asked
"why she was the only one complaining," and when Mrs. Davis
contacted the principal, she was told that "he guess[ed he would]
have to threaten [the boy] a little bit harder., 234 With no other
avenue of help available and no school policy or procedures on
sexual harassment to assist
her, Davis brought suit under Title IX
35
board.2
school
against the
The district court dismissed the complaint deciding that "[t]he
sexually harassing behavior of a fellow fifth grader is not part of a
school program or activity, 2' 36 and thus, the school district could
not be held liable under Title IX. Then a divided panel of the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that
Title IX "encompasses a cause of action when a school district
fails to address and remedy a hostile environment created by a
student's sexual harassment of which it knew or should have
known. ' ' 7 The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, then vacated the
panel's decision and held that the Davis complaint "fail[ed] to state
a claim under Title IX because Congress gave no clear notice to
schools and teachers that they ... would accept responsibility for
remedying student-student sexual harassment when
they chose to
238
IX.,,
Title
under
assistance
financial
federal
accept
In justifying the court's decision, Judge Tjoflat began by noting
that Title IX is simply not applicable to this case. 239 He argued that
a school district is faced with a predicament of choosing between
233
234

235

Id.

Id.
Id.

2" Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D.Ga.
1994).
237 Petitioner's Brief at 4, Davis (No. 97-843).
= Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir.
1997) (reasoning that "[i]mposing liability of the sort envisioned by [Davis]
could induce school boards to simply reject federal funding-in contravention of
the will of Congress").
239 Id. at 1401 (noting that "nothing in the language or history of Title IX
suggests that Title IX imposes liability for student-student sexual harassment").
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lawsuits, one from the victim and one from the alleged harasser.
Because a school district's only means of sufficiently disciplining
a student harasser may be to suspend or expel, it may also face
liability under Fourteenth Amendment principles because that
student may claim a property interest in his or her education that
cannot be deprived without due process of law.uo Furthermore,
Judge Tjoflat recognized that expansion of Title IX liability in this
context would equate to staggering litigation costs.2 ' He based
this contention on a study that showed that sixty-five percent of
school students in secondary education were victims of student-tostudent harassment. Judge Tjoflat further argued that school
districts, faced with these escalating costs of litigation, may choose
not to receive federal funds specifically to escape the risk of Title
IX liability.242 Based on the aforementioned reasons, the Eleventh
Circuit denied Davis an action against the school board.243
In a recent opinion by Justice O'Connor that may have farreaching consequences, the United States Supreme Court disagreed
with the Eleventh Circuit in Davis.2 4 The Court directly addressed
the issue of "whether and under what circumstances, a recipient of
federal educational funds can be liable in a private damages action
arising from student-on-student sexual harassment."245 In a five to
four decision, the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's ruling,
finding instead that a private damages action is available in eases
of student-on-student sexual harassment where a funding recipient
is deliberately indifferent to known claims of sexual harassment,
and where the harassing conduct is "so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the
school." 2A Justice O'Connor followed the Court's previous actual
notice plus deliberate indifference standard articulated in Gebser to

24 0

td at 1402.

2 Id at 1404. See also Savage, supra note 228, at 38. "Holding schools
liable
for such harassment could generate 7.8 million lawsuits." Id.
242 See
id at 1405.
mId at 1406.
244 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
245
Id. at 1668.
246Id at 1675.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999

39

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1999], Art. 7

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

find that Davis had an actionable claim.247 The dissent, on the
other hand, criticized the majority for its "inability to provide any
workable definition of actionable peer harassment ' ' 24" and focused
instead on the "potentially crushing financial liability for
student
249
IX.,,
Title
by
terms
clear
in
conduct that is not prohibited
After Gebser it seemed incontrovertible that the Court would
allow liability for a school district for the misconduct of third
parties. However, Justice O'Connor made clear in Davis that it is
the school district's failure to act against known incidents of
student-on-student harassment that effectively deprives the student
victim of the educational benefits protected by Title IX.250 She
further reasoned that since Title IX was enacted by Congress
pursuant to its spending clause power, a funding recipient accepts
the risk of liability for its failure to comply with the mandates of
federal legislation, much like in a contract.25
Moreover,
"subject[ing] students to discrimination" via deliberate indifference
to misconduct constitutes a violation of Title IX. 252 Thus, such
liability does not arise from agency or negligence principles, but
rather from "the district itself intentionally act[ing] in clear
violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent
to acts
25 3
knowledge.,
actual
had
it
which
of
harassment
...
of
Can direct liability be imposed on school districts when the
harassing conduct is carried out by a student rather than by a
teacher over whom the district has control in hiring and firing?
Indeed, as the dissent pointed out, "a public school does not
control its students in the way it controls its teachers or those with

Id. at 1674-75.
Id. at 1687 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
249
Id. at 1685 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
250 Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1670. "Here, petitioner attempts to hold the Board
liable for its own decision to remain idle in the face of known student-on-student
harassment in its schools." Id.
2' Id. "When Congress acts pursuant to its spending power, it generates
legislation much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the
States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions." Id.
252 Id. at 1671.
2 Id.
247

248
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whom it contracts."- 4 Justice O'Connor limited a school's
damages liability to "circumstances wherein the recipient exercises
substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which
the known harassment occurs."' 55 This control test when applied
to the facts in Davis revealed that the school board had significant
control over the student harasser, control that has been described as
"custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and
'
control that could not be exercised over free adults." W
Furthermore, the context wherein the acts of harassment took place
was "under" an "operation" of the school district: the classroom.
The student harasser in this case, G.F., exacted his sexual remarks
and lewd behavior "during school hours and on school grounds."' 57
Thus, the school board's control in this case, exhibited in its
potential for disciplinary authority over the harasser and the
situation in which the harassment took place, subjected LaShonda
Davis to discrimination for which it may be held directly liable.
The majority was careful to make clear that Title IX does not
require certain prescribed remedial action for peer sexual
harassment. Indeed, the Court was quick to point out that schools
would retain flexibility in dealing with student harassers, as long as
the response is not "clearly unreasonable." 258 Thus, administrators
are not forced to take particular remedial action like expulsion.
Rather, they must take disciplinary action that will effectively
ensure equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities,
a fine line when the harasser and the victim are both students. The
dissent focused on the problems that school administrators will

254d.

at 1681. "Most public schools do not screen or select students, and their

power to discipline students is far from unfettered." Id.(Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
= Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1672.
26Id at 1673 (quoting Vernonia School Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655
(1995)).
257
Id. at 1672.
28 Id at 1674. 'Title IX imposes no such requirements. On the contrary, the
recipient must merely respond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not
clearly unreasonable." Id
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face in balancing one's fundamental right to education with
another's right not to be subjected to harassment.259
Yet when does harassment rise to the level of conduct "so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive... that [it] so
undermines and detracts from the victims' educational
experience"? 260 Justice O'Connor attempted to answer this
question by looking at a "constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships, 26' and warned
courti to be aware of the differences- between the workplace and
the classroom. Indeed, school children are still learning how to
socialize and often do not display appropriate behavior in certain
circumstances. Schoolyard taunting and teasing is commonplace
in every community and social status across the county and it is not
unusual for a student's testing of profanity and insults to include
gender-specific comments. Thus, the majority made clear that
"[d]amages are not available for simple acts of teasing and namecalling among school children.., even where these comments
target differences in gender., 262 The dissent, however, forecasts a
myriad of problems for schools who must now ensure that
"thousands of immature students conform their conduct to
acceptable norms" of behavior.263 Indeed, in a day and age where
our nation's schools are already overwhelmed by guns in the
schools and school violence, 26 4 how can schools be expected to
also police the "normal teasing and jostling of adolescence?"26
259 Id. at 1682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "In at least some States, moreover,
there is a continuing duty on schools to educate even students who are
suspended
or expelled." Id.
26
0 Davis, 119 S. Ct. at
1675.
26, Id. Such circumstances include but are not limited to
"the ages of the
harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved." Id.
262d. at 1675.
263 Id. at 1682. "School districts cannot exercise the same measure of control
over thousands of students that they do over a few hundred employees." Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
264

Chris Riemenschneider, Is it Only Rock n' Roll? Debate Continues Over

Role of Music in Columbine Shootings, Tulsa World, June 4, 1999, at 3

(discussing whether music motivated Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold to shoot "to
death 12 classmates and a teacher at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colo.,
and then [kill] themselves"); see also DA Dave Thomas on the Littleton

Tragedy, PROSECUTOR, July-Aug. 1999, at 25.
26 Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, the dissent points out that schools lack the resources
to deal with such problems and that what resources are available
should be used for educational programs.26
However, the majority in Davis suggests that harassment so
severe that it denies its victim access to educational benefits is
worthy of a private damages action. Indeed, Justice O'Connor
applied the standard to the facts in Davis to conclude that the
school board may be held liable for its knowledge and deliberate
indifference to the harassment. Here, the misconduct persisted for
months and included not only sexual taunts but also suggestive
behavior and inappropriate touching. The conduct took place on
school grounds while school was in session and was made known
to the school board on numerous occasions.
Furthermore,
LaShonda's grades declined over the course of the harassment, and
while not direct evidence of denial of educational benefits it does
provide "necessary evidence of a potential link between her
education and G.F.'s misconduct." 2 7 According to the majority,
the Monroe County school district's failure to respond to this
instance of student-on-student harassment can support a private
suit by petitioner for money damages. Thus, the United States
Supreme Court has concluded that schools can be made to pay for
the consequences of peer sexual harassment.
Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Davis, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in a subsequent decision,
Soper v. Hoben,2'6 refused to hold a school district and school
board liable for money damages. 2 0 Although the Sixth Circuit
purported to analyze the case in light of the decision in Davis, it
nonetheless affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the action.270
Interestingly, the Court was indifferent to the fact that oral
arguments of the parties were made prior to the decision in

2

6S Id

at 1676.
2rIa
63 No. 98-1550,

1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 28396 (6th Cir. Nov. 2. 1999).

Soper v. Hoben, No. 98-1550, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 28396, at *26 (6th

Cir. Nov. 2, 1999).
270 Id. at *24.
The Court recognized the recent Supreme Court decision
establishing that Title IX may support a claim for student-on-student sexual
harassment when the plaintiff can make the appropriate showing. Id.
a

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999

43

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1999], Art. 7

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

Davis.271 In what seems to be a total disregard of the Davis
Court's reasoning in formulating the test, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of this action despite the teacher's actual
knowledge of the harassment and the apparent deliberate
indifference to the student harassment by the school. 2
In Soper, an action was commenced by the mother of a female
special education student based on alleged harassment, sexual
molestation and rape by three classmates. 273 The court found that
since there was sufficient evidence to support the assertion that the
child was raped, harassed and sexually abused, the first prong of
the Davis test had been satisfied.27 4 However, the court took issue
with the second and third portions of the Davis test. 275 The -court
found that the defendants in Soper did not have actual knowledge
of the harassment until after it had allegedly occurred and that they
took immediate action to correct the situation upon noticeY6rn
Although the majority in Soper held the Davis standard had not
been met, Judge Moore dissenting in part, found that there was a
271

Id. at *24. The court noted that oral argument was completed prior to the

Davis decision, however there was no re-argument. Id.
272
273

Id. at *32 (Moore, J., dissenting).

Id. at *2. The alleged harassment, sexual molestation and rape occurred

both inside of the school and on a school bus. The sexual molestation by two
male students allegedly took place in the back of the classroom while the teacher
was in the hallway as well as on the school bus. Id. at *6. It is alleged that the
third male student forced the plaintiff to hide in the back room of the classroom
while the teacher locked the room for lunchtime and thereafter raped her. Id. at
*7.
274 Id. at *24. The court found that the harassment endured by the female
student was "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive sexual harassment that
could deprive Renee of access to the educational opportunities provided by her
school." Id. at 25.
275 Id. at *24.
The second portion of the Davis test requires the funding
recipient to have had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment. The third
prong of the Davis test requires the funding recipient to have bee deliberately
indifferent to the harassment.
276 Id. at *25. After receiving notice of the incidents, the
defendants contacted
the proper authorities, initiated internal investigations, placed windows on the
classroom doors and placed an aide in the classroom where the incidents took
place. Further, the defendants offered to increase the supervision of the plaintiff
while providing her with an escort while in school. Lastly, upon notice of the
criminal charges, the defendants expelled the student allegedly responsible. Id.
at *26.
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question as to whether the defendants had actual knowledge of the
harassment and therefore the action should not have been
dismissed on summary judgment.2r Judge Moore noted that the
majority had analyzed the claim based on the final instance of
harassment, the alleged rape, and point out that Soper had made
previous complaints to the defendants' regarding the student
ultimately responsible for the rape.278 He argued that despite the
plaintiff's concerns, and the defendants assurances of safety, no
affirmative action was taken by the defendants to stop the previous
acts of harassment nor was any action taken to prevent future acts
of harassment.2 7 9 Accordingly, in light of the recent Davis
decision, Judge Moore would not have dismissed the action on
summary judgment, but rather would have allowed the plaintiffs
the opportunity to make their case before a jury.28
VI.

CONCLUSION

The legal concept of sexual harassment has evolved in our
nation's courts in recent years to deal with both pervasive and
insidious forms of discrimination based on sex. Suits against
employers and federally funded educational institutions have
increased as society struggles to define what is acceptable versus
actionable conduct, and to determine who will be accountable for
such behavior. The contours of employer and institutional liability
were mapped out by the United States Supreme Court last term as
the Court allowed a private right of action under Title VII and Title
IX, respectively. Furthermore, the Court has recently recognized
277
278

d at *32 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Id (Moore, J., dissenting). Although the final act of harassment considered

by the majority was discovered in October, 1994, Mrs. Soper had first expressed
concerns about this particular student to the defendants in 1993. Id.at *3. Mrs.
Soper expressed similar concerns in August, 1994, when she became aware of
the student's abusive family background and requested that her daughter not be

left alone with this student based on this information in addition to the known
incident in October, 1993. Id. at *5.
279 Id. at *33. (Moore, J., dissenting) (stating that the previous incidents had
been known to some of the defendants and therefore the defendant did have
actual notice; however, there was no special attention given to the situation). Id.
at *33.
2o Id. at *33 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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the potential for school board liability for student-on-student
sexual harassment, despite a heightened standard of liability that
includes deliberate indifference to known peer sexual harassment
by school officials and conduct that is so severe and pervasive as to
deprive the student victim of the benefits of education.28 '
The nation's highest court has seemingly recognized that sexual
harassment affects society as a whole. Society pays for the loss of
productivity in the workplace and for the academic downfall of our
nation's youth who are prevented from receiving the education that
is guaranteed them due to the misconduct of a teacher, coach or
fellow student. The Supreme Court has addressed the problem and
placed the burden of policing the unwelcome conduct on the
employers who are in the best position to deal with the harasser in
the workplace and school officials who can properly discipline
conduct that
passes the line from schoolyard taunts to
28 2
harassment.
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